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Backgroundtothedebate:Afterthe
failure of three large clinical trials of
vaginal microbicides, a Nature edi-
torial stated that the microbicide
field ‘‘requires a mechanism to help
it make rational choices about the
best candidates to move through
trials’’ [1]. In this month’s debate,
James Lavery and colleagues pro-
pose a new mechanism, based on
stopping trials early for ‘‘opportu-
nity costs.’’ They argue that micro-
bicide trial sites could have been
saturated with trials of scientifically
less advanced products, while new-
er, and potentially more promising,
products were being developed.
They propose a mechanism to real-
locate resources invested in existing
trials of older products that might
be better invested in more scientif-
ically advanced products that are
awaiting clinical testing. But David
Buchanan argues that the early
stopping of trials for such opportu-
nity costs would face insurmount-
able practical barriers, and would
risk causing harm to the partici-
pants in the trial that was stopped.
James Lavery and Colleagues’
Viewpoint: We Should Be Able
To Reallocate Clinical Trial
Resources to Scientifically More
Promising Technologies
An intravaginal microbicide that can
block the transmission of HIV remains
elusive in the wake of a long, agonizing
series of scientific setbacks and social
challenges [2,3]. Clinical trials require a
large amount of financing, research and
clinical infrastructure, investigator exper-
tise and time, and goodwill and buy-in of
communities from which thousands of
research participants are enrolled for
many years. The extent to which these
resources can continue to be mobilized to
meet the anticipated demand in HIV
prevention trials, and other areas of global
health research, is unknown.
We turned our attention to the micro-
bicide field in October 2006. At that time,
available clinical trial sites in the develop-
ing world were nearing saturation with
trials of scientifically less advanced, less
promising, ‘‘first generation’’ products
(e.g., polyanion, surfactant, and buffering
microbicides), while newer, potentially
more promising, ‘‘next generation’’ anti-
retroviral-containing products were being
developed, some of which were nearly
ready for phase III clinical trials [4]. There
was growing concern that the ‘‘cycle time’’
of development of next generation prod-
ucts would outpace the capacity for
clinical trial testing, resulting in a queue
for testing of antiretroviral-containing
microbicides. This scenario did not come
to fruition as unexpected product failures
and prematurely halted trials emptied
several large clinical trial sites and resolved
the ‘‘microbicides queue problem,’’ albeit
in an extremely disappointing fashion. But
a Nature editorial at the time called for a
mechanism to address this problem [1].
Although the microbicides queue prob-
lem receded, it would be unwise to view it
as an isolated case. With massive invest-
ments in discovery and development in
global health during the past decade,
promising new drugs, vaccines, and devic-
es could emerge ready for phase III testing
more rapidly than the appropriate clinical
trial sites can be identified and developed.
For example, after decades of dormancy,
the prospect of an effective malaria
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several successful clinical trials [5,6], a
number of promising concepts [7,8], and a
massive commitment of funding, both for
research [9] and for advance purchasing of
an effective vaccine [10]. The best time to
discuss and solve a potential ‘‘cycle time’’
problem is now; not when we are in the
throes of a crisis.
Stopping Early for Opportunity
Costs—A Potential Solution to the
Cycle Time Problem
One solution to the ‘‘cycle time’’
problem is to propose a new reason for
stopping trials early—because of their
opportunity costs. Sponsors should have
a mechanism to reallocate resources in-
vested in existing trials of older products
that might be better invested in more
scientifically advanced and promising
products that are awaiting clinical testing.
There have been cases of industry-
sponsored clinical trials being stopped
early. These may be examples of stopping
early for opportunity costs where those
costs are measured in likelihood of financial
returns [11]. Here, we are talking instead
about opportunity costs measured in public
health benefits alone.
Early stopping of clinical trials is
currently accepted for reasons of safety,
efficacy, or futility on the recommenda-
tions of data safety and monitoring boards
(DSMBs). However, to the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first proposal to
consider early stopping for public health–
related opportunity costs. We believe that
under specific conditions, with specified
processes and safeguards, opportunity
costs may be a legitimate reason for
stopping trials early. Our proposal could
increase the efficiency and speed of clinical
research for the world’s most pressing
global health problems.
Standards for Early Stopping Based
on Opportunity Costs
The substantive standard for decisions
to stop an existing trial in favor of a
strategic move to another product should
be that a trial of the new product is ready
to begin and that there is a compelling
scientific rationale for why the new
intervention may be considered more
promising. Of course, determining when
a new product or technology is more
promising than one currently undergoing
testing requires expert consensus, and
there are inherent uncertainties involved.
Up-front commitments must be made
to ensure that any early stopping of a trial
does not diminish the standard of care
provided to individuals enrolled under the
initial enrollment agreement. Such com-
mitments may involve preparedness plan-
ning, clear communication on the consent
form [12] and in the consent process, and
prior agreements among the study spon-
sors and participating communities.
Opportunity Costs and Priority
Setting: The Need for a Legitimate
Decision-Making Process
Although there are many bodies associ-
ated with clinical trials that have the
authority to make a wide range of strategic
and operational decisions, there are no
specific bodies charged with identifying
strategic research priorities in the face of
resource scarcity. To claim legitimacy,
such a body would have to be indepen-
dent, with a mandate to advise research
funders and funding consortia on an entire
field of research, such as microbicides, or
perhaps even more broadly, such as across
HIV prevention approaches. This body
would review the relevant science to make
periodic assessments of current technolo-
gies against the most promising new
alternatives, would be established external
to the existing trials, and would have
representation from all legitimate stake-
holders. Most importantly, it would pro-
vide recommendations about stopping
established trials for opportunity costs
when it felt there was a compelling
scientific rationale to do so.
One framework that could be used for
priority setting is known as ‘‘accountability
for reasonableness,’’ a framework that is
grounded in justice theories emphasizing
democratic deliberation [13–18]. This
framework requires four conditions to be
met for fair priority setting.
Relevance would require sound argu-
ments supported by credible evidence
about why an alternative strategy would
be superior and a conclusion that stopping
the current trials and pursuing alternative
strategies is the most responsible way to
use the available resources. Publicity would
require that individuals and communities
who might agree to participate in clinical
trials be made aware of the proposed
advisory body and its mandate as a routine
part of informed consent. The ‘‘opportu-
nity costs approach’’ must be transparent,
i.e., the rationales for stopping would have
to be publicly accessible and open to
scrutiny. The revision condition would
require that those who might disagree
with recommendations of the advisory
body be given an opportunity to present
new evidence or arguments. This condi-
tion would require a very clear and
efficient process. Finally, enforcement would
require the sponsoring organization(s) to
be accountable for ensuring these forego-
ing conditions are met [14].
How Would Early Stopping
Decisions for Opportunity Costs Be
Implemented?
We envision two possible mechanisms
for implementing early stopping for op-
portunity costs—either creating a new
type of scientific oversight committee or
simply expanding the mandate of existing
DSMBs. Mechanisms such as those we
propose here were explicitly advocated by
the Nature editorial cited above [1]—and
may also have broader applicability in
global health research.
Option 1: The scientific oversight
committee. An independent advisory
board—a scientific oversight committee
(SOC)—could be established by the
research partners in much the same way
that DSMBs are currently created [19].
The SOC’s mandate would be to review
all relevant science in the field and to
make periodic assessments of the
performance of the research against the
most promising alternatives. The
legitimacy of the SOC would be derived
from the agreement and representation of
the principal parties involved, all of whom
have a stake in the conduct and outcome
of the trial: funders, researchers,
communities engaged in the research,
DSMBs, relevant institutional review
boards, and possibly the relevant
regulatory authorities. An oversight
process would need to be established,
with a broad remit that takes into
account these varied interests before a
decision is made to stop any trials early.
The scope of the SOC’s mandate would
depend on the degree of cooperation and
coordination among research funders and
the degree to which the analyses and
recommendations of the SOC were per-
ceived to be well-founded, independent,
and fair by the broad community of
stakeholders. The SOC process could also
help funders in collective decision-making
about jointly supported clinical trials.
The SOC would be required to consid-
er factors outside the current trial in
determining whether stopping an existing
clinical trial and investing instead in a new
trial is warranted. It would be essential
that the SOC work closely with the
DSMBs and investigators throughout the
relevant trials. Information from the
ongoing studies and updates of the most
recent scientific and clinical data would
need to be shared throughout. The
proposed SOC decision-making process
is illustrated in Figure 1.
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committee and therefore is likely to
encounter some initial resistance in an
already complex and bureaucratic field.
Although we envision the SOC as having
an advisory mandate, in order to satisfy
the conditions of accountability for rea-
sonableness, it would have to deal espe-
cially with strong differences of opinion
among stakeholders and appeals for revi-
sions to SOC recommendations. A key
challenge in this regard would be to design
a process that could reliably and efficiently
share the necessary information, and
accommodate new rationales, while avoid-
ing becoming a platform for the personal
commitments of champions of one specific
product or another. One advantage of an
Figure 1. The proposed SOC decision-making process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000071.g001
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together in a particular area—for exam-
ple, if a large foundation and a public
research funding agency struck a joint
SOC.
Option 2: Expanding the mandate of
existing DSMBs. An alternative to the
creation of the SOC, but one designed to
accomplish the same goals, would be to
expand the mandate of existing DSMBs.
These boards already take external
rationales into account in their decisions
to recommend stopping trials early,
though they lack the necessary
frameworks and procedures for doing so
in ways that might be viewed as
transparent and fair [12]. Option 2
would require networking of DSMBs in a
field of research, and also supplementing
DSMB membership with representatives
of participating research communities, for
reasons of legitimacy discussed above. The
advantage of building upon DSMBs is that
the existence, independence, acceptability,
and accountability of DSMBs is already
widely recognized and accepted. Likely
challenges for this approach would include
overcoming resistance to changes in the
DSMB mandate, and to decision-making
standards that would involve reasoned
judgments about a broader range of
evidence than is currently reflected in
statistical early stopping rules employed
by DSMBs [20].
Conclusion
We must ensure that we are getting
promising technologies in the hands of
people who need them as quickly and
efficiently as possible. A current inefficien-
cy in clinical trials, as highlighted by the
microbicide case, is the inability to reallo-
cate clinical trial resources to scientifically
more promising technologies. We have
proposed a solution—stopping clinical
trials early on the basis of opportunity
costs in global public health, following
clear standards and careful and fair
processes. The cost of inefficiency in
clinical trials in global health is measured
in lives of the poor. Under these circum-
stances, the status quo is not an answer.
David Buchanan’s Viewpoint:
Stopping Trials Early for
Opportunity Costs Is Practically
Infeasible and Ethically
Indefensible
James Lavery and colleagues recom-
mend a new standard for stopping clinical
trials early, based on ‘‘opportunity costs,’’
the potential waste of limited resources for
completing trials currently underway while
testing of potentially ‘‘more promising
technologies’’ is delayed. They propose
that a body be charged with responsibility
for monitoring scientific developments. If
more promising technologies emerge, then
this body should be authorized to stop
current trials in order to reallocate the
financial, material, and human resources
from the ongoing study to start a clinical
trial of the new intervention expeditiously.
Since criteria for assessing which technol-
ogies may be more promising are ‘‘inher-
ently uncertain,’’ they recommend that
this body use a fair procedural process,
based on Daniels and Sabin’s accountabil-
ity for reasonableness model, to decide
when to stop a trial for opportunity costs.
Their proposal, however, is ethically
indefensible and practically unworkable.
Potential Harm to Participants
Cannot Be Justified
The ethically fatal flaw in Lavery and
colleagues’ proposal is that they fail to
address how the potential harm to the
participants in the trial being considered
for early stopping can be justified. Because
research inherently poses the threat of
harm, the risk of enrolling participants in
clinical studies must be counter-balanced
by the benefit of generating new knowl-
edge. Since stopping a trial early severely
limits the knowledge gained by a study,
there must be an overriding ethical reason,
like preventing harm, to justify early
stopping.
DSMBs may legitimately stop trials
early for three reasons: (1) harm (the rate
of serious adverse events is higher in the
experimental arm than in the comparison
group); (2) efficacy (the rate of the desired
outcome in the experimental arm is
significantly higher than expected, based
on the hypothesized effect size); and (3)
futility (emerging effects are much smaller
than hypothesized, indicating that it will
be impossible to draw definitive conclu-
sions if the trial is continued, based on the
sample size for which the trial was
powered). A fourth reason, technically
not ‘‘early stopping’’ but ‘‘unblinding,’’ is
based on the emergence of evidence of the
superior efficacy of an intervention in an
independent trial, which triggers a recal-
ibration of the standard of care in
concurrent trials.
The ethical rationale for stopping trials
early for efficacy or for unblinding studies
is based on the harm caused by depriving
participants of a more effective treatment.
Continuing the current trial is no longer
ethically justifiable because treating re-
search volunteers with a therapy now
known to be inferior would result in
higher levels of morbidity and mortality
than providing the new, more effective
therapy. Lavery and colleagues’ proposal
for stopping trials early for opportunity
costs seems to resemble the reasoning
behind decisions to stop trials early for
efficacy or unblinding, but with crucial
differences.
First, the risk to participants could no
longer be justified because little-to-no
significant knowledge would be gained
from the trial stopped early. In agreeing
to be randomly assigned, the participants
were willing to expose themselves to the
threat of harm for the sake of advancing
science, but this counter-balancing benefit
would be voided if the proposed ‘‘oppor-
tunity cost’’ stopping rule was invoked.
The critical difference with the new
proposal is that, unlike early stopping for
efficacy or unblinding, parties to this
proposal could not claim that the partic-
ipants were being exposed to a treatment
that is now known to be inferior or
recommend a new therapy known to be
superior. Thus, exposure to the inherent
risk of research could not be justified by
the new knowledge to be gained (since
virtually none will), nor could researchers
claim that the trial must be stopped based
on the overriding moral imperative to
prevent harm by providing access to a
known better treatment (since none is
available).
Furthermore, for participants assigned
to the experimental condition, another
ethically significant difference between the
Lavery proposal and established warrants
for early stopping is evident. In cases of
unblinding, researchers can gain valuable
knowledge by comparing study partici-
pants who choose to switch to the new
‘‘standard of care’’ with those who decide
to continue with the original experimental
treatment. Continuing the trial is justified
because it will provide researchers and
participants with greater knowledge about
the effects of the original experimental
intervention, even under these less than
ideal conditions; the trial can proceed
based on the warranted assumption that
the original intervention could still prove
to be efficacious and possibly superior to
the newly established standard of care.
Unlike cases of unblinding, however,
the option of continuing the trial of the
‘‘older’’ experimental therapy would be
foreclosed under the early stopping for
opportunity costs proposal, as it would
contradict the intent to reallocate resourc-
es to a new trial. Without the clear need to
stop the trial to prevent harm, participants
in the treatment arm would thus be put in
the ethically indefensible situation of
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intervention where its potential benefit or
harm will be left undetermined. Signifi-
cantly, as the early stopping of several
recent microbicide trials shows, research
inevitably entails risk and, despite re-
searchers’ best efforts, experimental inter-
ventions sometimes cause harm. The
proposed new standard is ethically unac-
ceptable because participants in trials
stopped for opportunity costs would never
know whether they were benefited or
harmed by the original experiment, nor
would this potential harm be mitigated by
the provision of a better alternative.
Finally, the authors are vague about
who they see as being harmed. Passing
references to public health goals suggest
that they believe stopping trials early is
justified based on the potential benefit to
the population as a whole, implying that
this population is being deprived of the
benefits of the more promising technology.
If this is their intent, then the authors
would be shifting grounds from the harm
to the research participants to the poten-
tial harm to society. The authors may wish
to stake their claim here, but if so, they
need to make the case explicit and address
well-known criticisms of utilitarian argu-
ments that harms to the individual (en-
rolled in the trial) are justified on the
grounds of the greater good to society.
The Proposed Decision-Making
Process Is Impractical
The proposal is also untenable from a
practical standpoint. Currently, early stop-
ping rules are based on strict extrapola-
tions of statistical conventions for ruling
out type I errors (erroneously concluding a
difference exists when there is none).
While everyone agrees that the standard
p,0.05 is arbitrary, it is an accepted
scientific convention that has served the
advance of scientific progress well. Unlike
stopping guidelines now used by DSMBs,
which are based on the degree of scientific
certainty, Lavery and colleagues propose
that this criterion should be replaced by a
procedural standard, based on Daniels
and Sabin’s accountability for reasonable-
ness model.
Daniels and Sabin developed their
model for use in deciding which services
health insurance plans should cover [15].
A board is charged with fiduciary respon-
sibility for deciding, prototypically, wheth-
er the insurance pool should cover one
person’s enormous expenses for a rare yet
horrendous disease, versus providing den-
tal care for everyone enrolled in the plan.
Daniels and Sabin argue that their proce-
dural model is necessary because the
different values at stake do not have a
common metric, and hence, the only fair
way to decide how to allocate limited
resources is to use fair procedures, such as
a majority vote by the board, about which
services the plan should cover.
The authors recommend that the body
charged with stopping trials early for
opportunity costs use the same process. In
contrast to DSMB decisions based on
scientific certainty, Lavery and colleagues’
proposal would open deliberations to a
virtually unlimited range of value consid-
erations regarding the promise of new
technologies. For example, ‘‘promise’’
could be measured on the basis of potential
efficacy, seriousness of the health problem,
size and characteristics of populations
affected, prevention versus treatment, and
so on [21]. To press the point, many people
argue that promoting gender equity would
be more effective in preventing HIV/AIDS
than developing new medical interventions.
In such situations, board members would
be faced with weighing considerations
ranging from evidence from epidemiolog-
ical studies versus animal models, the
relative importance of primary versus
secondary outcomes, reducing health dis-
parities versus developing universal inter-
ventions, short-term versus long-term re-
sults, and so forth. Since these different
values cannot be put on a single scale, the
authors propose that this body must use a
fair procedure, such as majority vote, to
make the decision to stop a trial early in
order to divert the resources to the more
promising intervention.
The most immediate problem with this
proposal is that the authors state that their
proposal must include an appeals process,
but it is difficult to imagine that disputed
decisions will be resolved quickly. This is
particularly the case if one assumes that
the premise of the authors’ argument is
true, i.e., that reasonable people can
reasonably disagree about which technol-
ogy is more promising, hence the need for
resorting to a procedural process to make
the decision. Researchers and sponsors
who stand to lose would invariably seek to
introduce new evidence to make their case
that they should be allowed to proceed. It
is difficult to imagine, for example, that
Merck will quietly stand by while this body
diverts public resources from research on
its product to support research on a rival
product developed by Pfizer; or that
Anthony Fauci will accept that this body
can stop his research because they think
that Robert Gallo’s research is more
promising, particularly when these deci-
sions could, in principle, be made on the
basis of a split eight-to-six vote. The most
likely result is that the appeals process
would take years, which would ultimately
defeat the purpose of moving money and
resources into a new investigation quickly.
Ultimately, the proposal is impractical
because it does not provide sufficiently
clear standards to generate the trust and
confidence necessary for acceptance and
buy-in. This concern stems from the
related problems of failing to define how
representation on the decision-making
body will be determined and failing to
provide more substantive criteria for their
decision-making. The authors state that all
‘‘legitimate stakeholders’’ must be repre-
sented on the body, but provide no
guidance on the number or definition of
stakeholders who should be considered
legitimate. They then expect that those
parties who would be most directly
impacted by the decision will agree in
advance to the proposed new early
stopping rule. But it is not clear why the
invested parties would accept the proposed
new standard, given the uncertain terms
for decision-making. Ultimately, the cred-
ibility of any such body would be unten-
able because they are not accountable to
anyone; without true fiduciary responsibil-
ity for a defined set of resources, they will
not have the trust or authority to adjudi-
cate among the competing interests.
Conclusion
The opportunity costs proposal would
create distinct conditions previously unad-
dressed in analyses of early stopping
practices. Under the conditions proposed
by Lavery and colleagues, participants
would be asked to enroll in a trial with
the possibility that the threat of harm
would not be counter-balanced by the
benefits of generating new knowledge,
even when there are insufficient scientific
grounds to advise participants to start a
new alternate therapy known to be
superior. In addition, participants in the
treatment arm would be exposed to an
experimental intervention that inherently
posed the threat of harm, and then left
stranded without knowing whether they
were harmed or not. The authors claim
that it will be ethically sufficient merely to
forewarn potential participants about
these possibilities in the informed consent
document, but they offer no indication
about how the potential harms discussed
here can be justified. Finally, because
decisions about early stopping for oppor-
tunity costs would invariably provoke
heated disputes, precisely because there
would be no accepted substantive stan-
dards but ultimately only a procedural
vote, the proposal fails to provide compel-
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authority for making such consequential
decisions.
James Lavery and Colleagues’
Response to David Buchanan
The overarching theme of David Bucha-
nan’s response to our proposal is to reject it
because it is new—it would, he says, ‘‘create
distinctconditions previouslyunaddressed in
analyses of early stopping practices.’’ Ulti-
mately, the global health community and
the patients we serve will have to judge
whether loyalty to traditional decision-
making conventions in clinical trials has
helped bring poor women at risk of HIV
infection and other diseases the effective
preventions and treatments they deserve,
with the urgency the problem demands.
In our proposal, we stated that ‘‘up-
front commitments must be made to
ensure that any early stopping of a trial
does not diminish the standard of care
provided to individuals enrolled under the
initial enrollment agreement.’’ Buchanan
rejects this approach. He argues that
stopping a clinical trial early for opportu-
nity costs would harm research partici-
pants beyond standard of care concerns,
apparently by thwarting their important
interests in contributing to the advance-
ment of science, which he views as a
‘‘counter-balancing benefit’’ for assuming
the risks of participation. He does not
acknowledge that those interests might be
better served by adopting our proposal,
rather than locking participants into a trial
of a potentially inferior product.
Buchanan contrasts the decision-mak-
ing process that we outline in our proposal
with ‘‘DSMB decisions based on scientific
certainty.’’ His worry appears to be that
the level of ‘‘certainty’’ and authority of
DSMB decision-making for a particular
trial would be subverted by an endless
range of ‘‘value considerations,’’ including
the ‘‘seriousness of the health problem,
size and characteristics of populations
affected, prevention versus treatment,
and so on.’’ In fact, DSMB decision-
making procedures rarely, if ever, ap-
proach certainty, and the various ‘‘value
considerations’’ Buchanan describes are
frequently reflected in DSMB delibera-
tions, even if they are not formalized into
decision-making algorithms. Our original
proposal argued that the ‘‘substantive
standard for decisions to stop an existing
trial in favor of a strategic move to another
product should be that a trial of the new
product is ready to begin and that there is
a compelling scientific rationale for why
the new intervention may be considered
more promising.’’ We do not propose
substituting DSMB procedures with ideo-
logical debates about health and develop-
ment more broadly, as Buchanan suggests.
We were first prompted to develop our
proposal by widely reported negative trials
in the field of microbicides. Recently, the
PRO 2000 gel phase IIb trial reported a
trend towards efficacy, the first microbi-
cide trial to do so [22]. Further informa-
tion about the efficacy of PRO 2000 is
expected later this year when the results of
the larger UK Medical Research Council–
funded MDP 301 trial are announced.
Millions of women have been infected
with HIV since research on microbicides
began in the early 1990s, and since the
epidemic continues relentlessly, we must
do everything in our power to maximize
the efficiency with which the field of HIV
prevention gains answers to important
clinical questions.
David Buchanan’s Response to
Lavery and Colleagues
To be clear, I am seriously concerned
that Lavery and colleagues’ proposal
would create new conditions that pose
new and unprecedented risks to trial
participants. The novelty of their proposal
is that they maintain that the principle of
non-maleficence should be discounted. I
reject this proposition. It is a misguided
and treacherous position for Western
bioethicists to be taking about the conduct
of trials in international settings.
In response to my critique, Lavery and
colleagues suggest that they have not
broadened the purview of their proposed
new board beyond that of the delibera-
tions now standard for DSMBs. If this is
the case, then it is not clear why they have
proposed the creation of a new body and
one that they recommend use a different
set of decision-making rules, defined by
the accountability for reasonableness mod-
el. This model was conceived precisely to
handle situations in which there are
distinct and conflicting value consider-
ations at stake, conflicts for which the only
fair resolution is to shift to a procedural
mechanism for resolving such disputes
(such as a majority vote). If Lavery and
colleagues truly believe that their proposal
can be implemented under the tightly
bounded criteria of scientific certainty that
DSMBs now use, then it is not clear why
they have proposed abandoning that
standard and replacing it with decision-
making rules that were created for situa-
tions with inherent value conflicts.
Their stance that we must maximize
efficiency over all other considerations,
and in particular, over concerns for the
safety of research participants, is as
stunning as it is unacceptable.
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